‘‘The Air Belongs to the People’’: The Rise and Fall of a Postwar Radio Reform Movement by Pickard, Victor
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ASC) Annenberg School for Communication
10-2013
‘‘The Air Belongs to the People’’: The Rise and Fall
of a Postwar Radio Reform Movement
Victor Pickard
University of Pennsylvania, vpickard@asc.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers
Part of the Broadcast and Video Studies Commons, and the Social Influence and Political
Communication Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/418
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pickard, V. (2013). ‘‘The Air Belongs to the People’’: The Rise and Fall of a Postwar Radio Reform Movement. Critical Studies in Media
Communication, 30 (4), 307-326. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2012.705436
‘‘The Air Belongs to the People’’: The Rise and Fall of a Postwar Radio
Reform Movement
Abstract
The postwar 1940s witnessed the beginnings of a full-fledged broadcast reform movement composed of labor
activists, African Americans, disaffected intellectuals, Progressives, educators, and religious organizations.
Although this reform movement would never realize the full sum of its parts before it was quelled by
reactionary forces, it would succeed in registering significant victories as well as laying the necessary
groundwork for future reform. The following analysis draws from archival materials and interviews to recover
a largely forgotten moment in broadcast history, one that holds much contemporary relevance for current
media reform efforts and media policy issues.
Keywords
Media Reform; Media History; Broadcast Policy; Radio Studies; Social Movements
Disciplines
Broadcast and Video Studies | Communication | Social and Behavioral Sciences | Social Influence and
Political Communication
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/418





The postwar 1940s witnessed the beginnings of a full-fledged broadcast reform movement 
composed of labor activists, African Americans, disaffected intellectuals, Progressives, 
educators, and religious organizations. Although this reform movement would never realize the 
full sum of its parts before it was quelled by reactionary forces, it would succeed in registering 
significant victories as well as laying the necessary groundwork for future reform. The following 
analysis draws from archival materials and interviews to recover a largely forgotten moment in 
broadcast history, one that holds much contemporary relevance for current media reform efforts 
and media policy issues. 
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The vehemence with which segments of the U.S. public criticized 1940s radio is difficult to 
overstate. In its 1946 year-end review, the New York Times found ‘‘radio subjected to more 
obverse and insistent criticism than the industry had experienced in the whole of its previous 
twenty-five years’’ (Gould, 1946, p. 9). Another article claimed, ‘‘Criticism of radio is not new, 
but in 1946, as the industry enters its third decade richer, more powerful and more excruciatingly 
vulgar and meaningless than ever before, impatience has reached a higher peak of articulate 
disgust’’ (Young, 1946). A Harvard report on American media noted, ‘‘One need be no soft 
paternalist to believe that never in the history of the world have vulgarity and debilitation beat so 
insistently on the mind as they do now from screen, radio, and newsstand’’ (1945, p. 30). While 
there was significant agitation against media in general, the most pronounced activism focused 
on the airwaves, leading Fortune Magazine in 1947 to dub it the ‘‘revolt against radio.’’ 
Although articulated most forcefully among intellectuals and activists, evidence suggests 
that the depth and breadth of public unrest was more widespread than a few malcontents. 
Community radio ‘‘listening councils’’ sprang up to monitor local programming. Films and 
novels such as The Hucksters depicting sinister media moguls and advertising agents attracted 
significant audiences and press attention. Major newspapers and opinion journals across the 
country  ̶  particularly on the left, but also in mainstream trade journals such as Tide and Variety, 
popular magazines such as Reader’s Digest and Life, and business journals such as Fortune 
Magazine and Business Week  ̶  railed against the state of American broadcasting. 
Much postwar criticism centered on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
the government agency founded by Congress in 1934 to regulate telecommunications and 
broadcasting, and increasingly a target of activist interventions and public outrage. Indeed, FCC 
files at this time were stuffed with listeners’ complaints, indicating a pronounced anger toward 
radio. While social movements pushed from below, progressive policy proposals such as the 
FCC ‘‘Blue Book’’ and the Hutchins Commission’s radio report emerged from elite circles 
(Pickard, 2010a, 2011a). Many believed the postwar changes sweeping American society also 





The postwar period saw a moment of transition and ‘‘reconversion’’ in the U.S., and core social 
institutions came under increased scrutiny. New Deal liberalism had begun to falter with the rise 
of an anti-communist, conservative resurgence (Brinkley, 1995), but, despite this political shift to 
the right, a window of opportunity arose in the mid-to-late 1940s when structural reform still 
seemed possible. American society was not yet in thrall to reactionary politics, and many social 
movements, including those supporting labor and civil rights, continued to agitate for reform. 
The former saw massive strike waves in the mid-1940s (Lipsitz, 1994), and the latter saw a spike 
in momentum as African American veterans returned from war (Barlow, 1999). As these groups 
sought fairer representation on the air, their activism increasingly focused on radio as a vehicle 
for advancing specific issues, as well as a target for interventions to restructure the medium itself 
to become less hostile to activist messages (Fones-Wolf, 2006). 
A three-pronged assault against commercial radio came from social movements, 
progressive policymakers, and average American listeners who were upset with their typical 
radio fare. In particular, widespread condemnation of radio’s ‘‘excessive commercialism’’ 
galvanized a broad canvas of critical press coverage and irate letters sent to the FCC (Pickard, 
2011b). The radio broadcasting industry already faced uncertainty given the impending 
competition from television combined with a steep decline in revenue and loss of lucrative 
wartime sponsors (Time, 1946). For a brief period, historical conditions seemed ripe for a 
structural overhaul. Although this contentious moment would help direct U.S. media’s trajectory 
for the ensuing generations, this chapter in the history of American media reform has only rarely 





Many historical accounts touch upon 1940s radio (for example, Barnouw, 1968; Sterling & 
Kittross, 1978; Brinson, 2004; Hilliard & Keith, 2010), but few address discontent regarding its 
commercialization. Horwitz (1997) situates these years as the second of three key media reform 
periods, occurring after questions of broadcasting ownership and control were decided in the 
1930s, and before public broadcasting was established in the 1960s. Van Cuilenburg and 
McQuail (2003) see 1945 as the starting point for a new policy paradigm of ‘‘public service’’ 
media policy, while Sterling & Kittross (1978) depict it as the ‘‘Era of Great Change.’’ Havig 
(1984) suggests that popular criticism posed as a great challenge to broadcasters as did 
technological and financial disruptions. However, few histories have specifically addressed the 
importance of social movements and their efforts towards media reform. 
In fact, previous foundational literature has argued that people were generally happy with 
radio (Baughman, 1992) or that significant reform efforts had ended by the mid-1930s 
(McChesney, 1993). Baughman suggests that in the 1940s people were largely satisfied with 
radio and that ‘‘critics of radio’s commercial, oligopolistic foundations were few and far 
between’’ (1992, p. 20). Lazarsfeld ends his classic 1946 study with the observation that people 
generally accepted radio’s commercial nature. Other historians see less complacency toward 
radio, but conclude that the fundamental questions of ownership and control were largely settled 
by the mid-1930s (McChesney, 1993; Smulyan, 1994). 
Although much was put to rest in the 1930s when a commercial, privatized system 
prevailed over public alternatives  ̶  as McChesney’s work convincingly shows  ̶  crucial 
questions involving broadcasters’ obligations to the public remained. More recent scholarship is 
beginning to provide a counter-narrative by uncovering evidence that many constituencies were 
unhappy with 1940s commercial radio and resistance was commonplace (Toro, 2000; Socolow, 
2002; Newman, 2004; Fones- Wolf, 2006). Noting how this criticism differed from the 1930s, 
Newman asserts: ‘‘Instead of an intellectual elite attacking the commercial industry, a popular 
and widespread critique of the advertisers’ control over the American system of broadcasting 
emerged in 1946-1947’’ (2004, p. 291). Other historians have explored the media interventions 
of specific groups, especially labor (Godfried, 1997; Fones-Wolf, 2006) and African Americans 
(Barlow, 1999; Savage, 1999). In her study on the labor movement’s radio activism, Fones-Wolf 
(2006) argues that the Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (CIO) attacks on the NAB fomented 
a larger movement based on a ‘‘loose media reform coalition’’ that was both ‘‘wide-ranging’’ 
and now ‘‘largely forgotten’’ (p. 126). Similarly, Toro (2000) observes that postwar ‘‘political 
struggles over program regulation reveal the continuous presence of social reform groups as 
participants in the FCC’s broadcast policymaking.’’ 
Despite these revisionist trends, a thorough history of the 1940s broadcast reform 
movement does not yet exist. While Fones-Wolf ’s emphasis on labor’s role within this media 
reform coalition provides the first clear glance at how this movement operated, scholars have yet 
to provide a comprehensive view of its breadth, depth, and composition. Likewise, Toro 
observes that although a few scholars have looked at how media reform groups impacted policy 
after 1965, most ‘‘have fallen short in their examination of the role of social reform groups at the 
[FCC] prior to the 1960s’’ (2000, p. 9). Which social movement groups were involved in media 
reform in the 1940s, and what were their objectives? The following analysis is a first step 




Theoretical Framework and Methods 
 
This study uses a Gramscian theoretical framework (Gramsci, 1971), appraising the historical 
processes of simultaneous hegemonic blocs and currents of resistance as power arrangements 
constantly re-legitimate themselves. Such a conceptualization of history and power considers 
media policy as neither natural nor inevitable, but resulting instead from constant conflict and 
negotiation, with multiple, shifting terrains of struggle, particularly at the discursive level. The 
following analysis also draws from social movement theory, especially ‘‘movement framing’’ 
(McCammon et al., 2007). ‘‘Discursive opportunity structures,’’ as formulated by Ferree, 
Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002), suggests that social movements often begin as intellectual 
critiques that are opportunistically exploited by grassroots social forces. Media policy discourses 
in the 1940s reflect a growing cultural critique that dialectically combined with the beginnings of 
a popular radio reform movement. To make sense of these ever-shifting discursive realignments, 
this study relies on historical methods, including in-depth archival research of activist literature, 
memos, letters, and personal papers connected to individuals and groups that participated in 
1940s broadcast reform activities. Close attention was given to the personal papers of FCC 
Commissioner Clifford Durr, whose range of contacts serve as a lens through which to glimpse 
the inner-workings of a postwar media reform movement. Additionally, phone interviews were 
conducted with two Durr confidantes and long-term media reform activists central to the 1940s 
movement: Everett Parker, a leader of various progressive religious broadcast groups, and the 
late Norman Corwin, a famous radio personality and radio division director for a major 
progressive activist group. 
Out of this research, a general narrative emerges that traces the rise and fall of a postwar 
media reform movement. Based largely on FCC Commissioner Durr’s correspondences and 
various activist literature, the following analysis examines the anatomy of this movement  ̶  its 
tensions, successes, and failures  ̶  by focusing on particular groups, campaigns, and strategies. 
Groups not discussed in depth that were involved in specific postwar media reform campaigns 
include the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Jewish organizations, and women’s groups 
(Proffitt, 2010). Although disparate, the core reform groups’ media criticism and activism were 
remarkably similar and often coalesced around common goals and ideals, including fairness in 
media representation, the creation of alternative media, and increased access to media 
production. More specifically, to varying degrees all of these groups engaged with the 
policymaking process in an attempt to remake the American broadcast system along more 
democratic lines. Given the last decade’s surge in media reform activism, this history is 
particularly relevant to our contemporary moment. 
 
 
Labor Holds the Line in Dark Times 
 
Labor was arguably the first social movement to organize explicitly around media issues. 
Alongside other nonprofit organizations including churches and educational institutions, labor 
groups like the Chicago Federation of Labor were early owners and operators of AM stations 
(Godfried, 1997, p. 133). Yet by the mid-1940s, most of these nonprofits had been pushed off the 
air. Finding it increasingly difficult to gain airtime on commercial radio, the labor movement 
began contesting a rightward shift in the nation’s news discourse, particularly its overt censoring 
of pro-labor views and voices. Labor historian Nathan Godfried, pointing to a 1943 Federated 
Press poll that found 92% of the press was anti-labor, notes that it was not surprising that ‘‘the 
mass media reflected business interests and values,’’ especially with groups like the National 
Association of Manufacturers disseminating anti-labor propaganda messages as ‘‘briefs for 
broadcasters’’ (pp. 210-211). An example of censorship included zealously purging scripts for a 
Heywood Broun memorial broadcast of any mention that he founded the Newspaper Guild 
(Ernst, 1946, 142-145). The NAB Code Manual gave broadcasters ample cover for excluding 
labor, claiming ‘‘Discussion  ̶  or dramatization  ̶  of labor problems on the air is almost always 
of a controversial nature’’ (quoted in Ernst, p. 145). 
Although industry would benefit from the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act’s chilling effects, the 
mid-1940s still held bright spots for labor’s organizing and media strategies (Fones-Wolf, 2006; 
Lipsitz, 1994). The CIO, unlike the more accommodationist AFL, used radio as a public relations 
vehicle for organizing as well as a weapon against anti-labor employers. Godfried notes that 
while the AFL hierarchy had ‘‘no grievance against’’ commercial radio, the CIO wanted to 
‘‘meet propaganda with propaganda’’ (1997, pp. 210-211). The CIO’s political action committee 
galvanized reformers with its Radio handbook (1944), which contained instructions for getting 
on the air and promoting “freedom to listen.” 
In the pamphlet’s preface, CIO president Philip Murray wrote that the Labor Movement 
believes ‘‘that the years immediately ahead are the most critical we have ever faced,’’ and thus 
‘‘the people’’ must be ‘‘kept alert and informed as to their political interests.’’ ‘‘In this task,’’ he 
stated, ‘‘radio will inevitably play a very important part (CIO, 1944, pp. 2-5). Murray concluded 
that labor leaders and all those interested in ‘‘freedom of the air’’ must know their rights so that 
‘‘radio is used as intended, namely, to serve the best interest of the people.’’ The people’s right 
to the air was a recurring theme throughout the handbook. Seeing radio as an underutilized 
resource, the pamphlet stated that workers ‘‘have not taken full advantage of their right to use 
radio broadcasting.’’ ‘‘Labor has a voice,’’ the pamphlet stated, and ‘‘people have a right to hear 
it.’’ Although radio stations and equipment belong to broadcasters, ‘‘the air over which the 
broadcasts are made does not belong to companies or corporations. The air belongs to the 
people’’ (CIO, 1944, p. 6 original emphases). 
Variations of ‘‘The air belongs to the people’’ served as a common rallying cry for 1940s 
media reformers. For example, in the 1948 pamphlet ‘‘The radio listener’s bill of rights’’ 
(written by FCC Blue Book author Charles Siepmann) the Anti-Defamation League emphasized, 
‘‘The essential knowledge you must have  ̶  and spread  ̶  about radio is the fact that it is yours. 
The wavelengths of the air belong to the people of America’’ (p. 44). This slogan struck at the 
central absurdity of a commercial system monopolizing a crucial public resource only to exclude 
voices of wide swathes of the population. This heavily biased system struck many as inherently 
unjust, as illustrated by one listener’s comments: ‘‘While I am not a member of any union, as a 
patriotic American I am greatly interested in all sides of a question’’ (Keator, 1947). 
The CIO Radio handbook provided instructions for gaining radio time for a labor point of 
view via several discursive techniques, including ‘‘The straight talk,’’ ‘‘The round table 
discussion,’’ ‘‘The spot announcement,’’ and ‘‘The dramatic radio play.’’ The book encouraged 
activists to generate good publicity, advising them to ‘‘not hesitate to send out your 
announcements to consumer groups, cooperatives, women’s organizations, fraternal and 
religious organizations.’’ The book emphasized, ‘‘The more all these community organizations 
know about you and your ideas on national and local problems, the better you will be able to 
cooperate with them in any problem requiring political action’’ (p. 25). The handbook also 
provided advice about choosing optimal airtime (evenings, although difficult to attain), tips on 
making high-quality programs that were not ‘‘tight-laced’’ or ‘‘too dull,’’ and sample scripts for 
announcements and dramatizations titled ‘‘Are you registered?’’ and ‘‘What is the PAC?’’ 
Suggested topics included: ‘‘Labor’s war record,’’ ‘‘Child care and school lunch programs,’’ 
‘‘G.I. Joe and CIO,’’ ‘‘Why we are for FDR,’’ ‘‘The need for farm-labor unity,’’ ‘‘The negro in 
1944,’’ and ‘‘Women war workers’’ (p. 23). 
The book recommended responses to denied airtime included asking for the station 
manager’s refusal in writing, writing a response, and sending copies of all letters to the FCC 
Chairman. Noting ‘‘the tremendous influence’’ a letter of protest can have if sent to contest 
‘‘labor-baiting or any other objectionable programs,’’ the handbook also instructed readers to ask 
members ‘‘to report to your Radio Committee any programs or any statements over the radio 
which are unfair to labor, or tend to incite people against the Negro or the foreign-born, or sound 
pro-Nazi or pro-Axis, or in any other way are directed against the best interests of the people.’’ 
In these cases, the radio committee should ‘‘write letters of protest to the station, the sponsor of 
the program, the commentator or speaker’’ (CIO, 1944, pp. 30-32). The book concluded by 
asking readers about difficulty in placing programs; if their station carried pro-labor 
programming; and if labor representatives served on their local NAB listening council (CIO, 
1944, p. 47). 
The CIO also helped form the National Citizens Political Action Committee to organize 
petition and letter-writing campaigns urging the FCC to ensure equal time for labor perspectives 
and to provide more quality programming. Even as they continued fighting for an AM radio 
presence, many labor groups saw FM as a new theater of contestation, leading to an aggressive 
campaign for FM licenses to establish a foothold in radio markets across the nation. Unions 
attempted to gain airtime to offset propaganda and misrepresentation in the daily press and 
especially newspaper-owned stations (Ernst, 1946, p. 145). A major part of this struggle was 
challenging commercial stations’ license-renewals for not upholding the public interest. The first 
of these campaigns was launched against WHKC, which had censored the UAW-CIO vice 
president’s speech (Rosenberg, 1949). 
Despite agreeing that demonstrable anti-labor bias ran counter to a station’s public 
interest mandate, the FCC rejected the union’s petition and renewed WHKC’s license. The 
commission nonetheless agreed to hold hearings on the union’s ‘‘petition to reconsider,’’ which 
drew luminaries like the inveterate media industry attorney Louis Caldwell. Caldwell challenged 
the entire premise of the hearing as an attack on the First Amendment and the FCC’s original 
mandate to not police programming. In response, the UAW began a long tradition of media 
reformers using media content analyses to marshal evidence disproving commercial radio’s 
purported neutrality. Ultimately, the station agreed to stop censoring labor-friendly scripts and to 
air a diversity of viewpoints on issues important to labor groups. Moreover, the FCC’s decision 
forced the NAB to amend its code’s ‘‘no controversial issues’’ clause (Toro 2000). 
In addition to establishing an important role for reform groups during regulatory debates, 
this episode set an important precedent for defining broadcasters’ affirmative responsibilities to 
the public, helping set the stage for the later Fairness Doctrine (Simmons, 1978, p. 39). Stations 
across the country began to include labor voices, often in direct opposition to powerful anti-labor 
politicians. Broadcasters’ policy shift drew praise from labor’s sympathizers. An article by 
Corwin and Reitman (1945) noted that ‘‘Labor had waited a long time for this recognition.’’ 
According to the article, it was inconceivable that organized labor, the second largest 
membership in the country after churches, was not allowed to pay for airtime, while employer 
associations were given millions of dollars’ worth of free time to present their views. Supporters 
also noted that Labor had been forbidden to recruit members over the air, while employers could 
recruit employees and ‘‘anti-labor agitators’’ who were ‘‘permitted to air their biases daily’’ (p. 
219). 
Later that year, in a significant victory for the labor movement, the NAB formally 
discontinued its code. For a brief time, labor enjoyed greater parity on the air. The price of 
inclusion, however, was often to force more leftist groups off the air and to silence the radical 
edge of labor’s critique of capitalism. These concessions arguably discouraged on-air labor 
groups from confronting postwar repression and racism (Razlogova, 2007). Nonetheless, the 
CIO’s radio strategy was consistent with its larger social democratic vision emphasizing 
egalitarianism and expanded First Amendment freedoms. Although internal divisions 
undermined their effectiveness somewhat, unions often joined forces with African Americans, 






African Americans’ Radio Activism 
 
African Americans had many reasons to work toward a more democratic and inclusive media 
system. They were 
 
especially astute to radio’s unique power, reach, and influence, an awareness that 
emerged in the protests against Amos ‘n’ Andy and grew as the medium matured through 
the 1930s and 1940s. [Radio’s] ability to present politically charged aural images 
repeatedly and simultaneously to millions of listeners moved what we now call ‘‘the 
politics of representation’’ into a whole new realm. Attempts to manage and influence 
those representations would have to become a part of ongoing strategies for African 
American political and economic advancement. (Savage, 1999, p. 11) 
 
Contesting powerful commercial broadcasters would be an uphill but essential battle. African 
Americans also acutely understood how commercial media’s structural biases  ̶  especially labor 
and economic relations  ̶  produced such demeaning imagery and fostered bigotry and 
disenfranchisement. A letter to FCC Commissioner Durr from a prominent member of the 
National Negro Congress stated the problem as being two-fold: ‘‘First, the widespread 
discrimination in the employment of Negroes in almost every job category; and second, the 
stereotyping of Negro characters over the air’’ (Cadden, 1947). Another letter from a returning 
African American veteran, disgusted by the radio fare he was subjected to and the ‘‘race hatred’’ 
it fostered, wrote: ‘‘It is too often the practice of vehicles of American propaganda such as . . . 
the radio to depict the American Negro as a buffoon, lazy, shiftless, superstitious, ignorant, loose 
and servile’’ (Tymous, 1946). 
Economic concerns drove much of this criticism. During a discussion of the ‘‘Social 
Responsibility of Radio,’’ organized by the Institute for Education by Radio, Lester Granger, a 
representative fromtheNational Urban League, noted that his organization’s ‘‘first concern’’ was 
the ‘‘equality of economic opportunities for Negro citizens’’ (Tyler & Dasher, 1946, p. 162). 
Radio had stymied economic progress by perpetuating ‘‘some of the stock characterizations and 
caricatures of the printed word, the stage, and the screen, thus advancing stereotypes and 
continuing racial misconception.’’ Noting that depictions of African Americans had not changed 
for many years  ̶  exemplified by popular shows such as Duffy’s Tavern and Amos ‘n’ Andy  ̶  
Granger (Tyler & Dasher, 1946, p. 162) pointed out that a young person in 1946 ‘‘may not 
recognize the black-face minstrel caricature of by-gone days as radio’s ‘Rochester’ of today.’’ 
He also observed that African American bands were passed over for contracts given to white 
bands, primarily due to advertisers’ influence. Finally, his greatest indictment against radio was 
its lack of job opportunities for African Americans: 
 
Outside of the entertainers in radio  ̶  the musicians, singers, actors, and comedians   ̶  
there are scarcely two dozen colored men and women employed in the radio industry, 
behind the scenes where the wheels of radio are turning. And there are thousands of jobs 
in an industry that provides 130 million people with almost continuous radio listening. 
And there are hundreds of job classifications  ̶   pages and pagettes, file clerks, 
messengers, stenographers, typists, cashiers, bookkeepers, teletypists, research assistants, 
librarians, sound effects technicians, electricians; studio, maintenance, and recording 
engineers; artists, telephone operators, news analysts, announcers, scriptwriters, 
carpenters, firemen, private police  ̶  but almost no faces of my hue appear until . . . the 
janitors, the porters, the maids! (pp. 162-166) 
 
In some cases, African Americans were hired temporarily as freelance voice coaches or 
programming consultants, but never as permanent staff (Rothenbuhler & McCourt, 2002, p. 373; 
Barlow, 1999). African American advertising also faced discrimination. One letter from 
Gainesville, Florida to the Southern Conference for Human Welfare complained that ‘‘although 
a substantial proportion of radio listeners and total business in the community is Negro, all radio 
stations in the community refuse to accept advertising by Negro businesses at any time, on more 
or less spurious grounds’’ (Dombrowski, 1947). 
Increasingly, this blatant racism served as a rallying point for all progressive radio 
reformers. Reform groups called for removing on-air negative stereotypes and for hiring more 
African Americans. They encouraged communities to exercise their rights as listeners, scrutinize 
local radio, and not be afraid to call stations to complain when they failed to serve the public. 
Setting up ‘‘listening posts’’ to monitor broadcasts for balanced commentary, they coordinated 
with progressive allies in the FCC, especially Durr, who joined with labor and civil rights leaders 
to advocate for ‘‘listener’s rights’’ (Toro, 2000; Fones-Wolf, 2006). The National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), whose Radio Committee teamed up with 
other reform groups in the late 1940s, organized consumer boycotts and used the courts to 
pressure media outlets to improve their treatment of African Americans (Toro, 2000, pp. 52-54). 
Their tactics raised awareness of stereotypes and helped increase the number of African-
American-oriented shows, many with black disc jockeys. Benefitting from African Americans’ 
growing clout as a consumer group, these shows jumped from a handful in the late 1940s to over 
200 by 1952. Although black-owned radio outlets were rare  ̶  unlike newspapers such as the 
Chicago Defender and the Pittsburgh Courier  ̶  legitimating African American programming 
was a significant accomplishment. 
Despite these advances, the overall success for African American reform efforts was 
mixed. The practice of blacklisting and other red-baiting tactics ruined many of the most 
outspoken activists’ careers and helped demobilize progressive groups. Those victimized during 
this period included some of the most accomplished African American artists and intellectuals 
such as Paul Robeson, Langston Hughes, and Canada Lee (Biondi, pp. 176-177). Robeson would 
never recover from having his career destroyed; Hughes was harassed by Senator McCarthy; Lee 
faced continued blacklisting and died in 1952 at the age of 45, shortly before he was to be 
questioned by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). 
 
 
Progressive Dissident Intellectuals 
 
Dissident intellectuals provided the media reform movement with another base of support. One 
exemplar, the People’s Radio Foundation (PRF), was a NYC-based organization composed of 
left-wing and progressive groups mobilizing around media issues. Founded in October 1944 and 
composed of trade union leaders, labor activists, editors, publishers, writers, and artists, the PRF 
sought a ‘‘people’s FM network’’ to air uncensored labor and progressive views. Its vision came 
out of discussions between the future PRF director, Joseph Brodsky, a prominent labor lawyer; 
Leslie Goldman, a labor editor; and Eugene Konecky, a former director of radio publicity, 
commercial, and program for an NBC affiliate station. Konecky had written Daily Worker and 
Sunday Worker articles about the potential of liberal and labor-owned FM stations, which 
reportedly drew hundreds of positive letters from around the country. 
The PRF was stymied by a triad of powerful interests: state officials such as J. Edgar 
Hoover and HUAC; reactionaries such as ultra-conservative American Legion members; and 
industry representatives such as the Chamber of Commerce (Konecky, 1948, pp. 102-106). 
Despite formidable adversaries, the PRF’s campaign for a broadcast license received 
considerable support: charter members included labor leaders from the New York Newspaper 
Guild, the National Maritime Union, and the American Communication Association. The new 
organization also included women’s leagues, African American groups, and veterans 
associations as well as many leading intellectuals and artists, big-name backers such as Eugene 
O’Neil, Norman Corwin, and Charlie Chaplin. Following a 10-month campaign, the PRF sold 
$60,000 in preferred stock to approximately 400 individuals and organizations for the proposed 
station. 
PRF programming plans included a show called The Minorities are Major, relying on 
various musical and dramatic formats to raise awareness about anti-Semitism and racism. To 
explore feminist history and experimental children’s programs, they proposed a show called 
Past, Present, and Future (Fones-Wolf, 2006, pp. 140, 157-159). The PRF campaigned on an 
overtly pro-labor platform, with plans for shows like dramatizations of the history of labor; the 
story of the African Americans from 1619 to present day; forums with local high schools to 
discuss political questions; studies of American folk music; and experimental theater 
laboratories. Proposed programming took on political issues, including ‘‘frank criticisms of 
Congressional activity,’’ and ‘‘case histories of social problems.’’ The PRF promised only 
‘‘informative advertising,’’ for consumers union-endorsed products and vowed to bar ‘‘singing 
commercials’’ and ‘‘descriptive advertising.’’ Permitted commercials would state ‘‘the facts 
about the product’s function without spiraling off into a superlative exaggeration of that 
product’s performance.’’ Advertisers would be allowed no editorial influence; instead, the PRF’s 
organizational model would be sustained by ‘‘the civic groups, unions, and the organizations 
represented among the stockholders’’ (Konecky, 1948, p. 108). 
Pledging listener control over programming, PRF director Brodsky hoped to see 
community productions of ‘‘people’s music, people’s drama, people’s dramatization’’ (Konecky, 
pp. 106-107). Prior to public FCC hearings, over 75 performers and technicians simulated a 
broadcast of several shows that the major networks had deemed too controversial  ̶  including one 
titled ‘‘Heil, Columbia!’’ whose scripts dealt with recent lynchings in Columbia, Tennessee. 
Another show addressed the specter of an atomic war. After the success of these performances, 
the PRF continued to rent out theaters to enlist local talent to perform shows, hold workshops, 
satirize commercial radio, and draw attention to local social problems. The PRF created a mobile 
company of actors and writers and a speakers’ bureau of young people from unions and veterans 
groups to spread the PRF story to clubs and organizations throughout the city. Through a letter-
writing campaign, they sent thousands of wires and handwritten notes urging the FCC to grant 
PRF a license (Konecky, 1948, pp. 108-109; Fones-Wolf, 2006, p. 158). 
The PRF’s decidedly left-wing orientation earned the ire of anti-communists who 
operated through various media. The pro-industry trade magazine Broadcasting repeatedly 
played up the PRF’s communist links, including how Brodsky served as the Communist party’s 
chief counsel for many years. Prior to the FCC hearing, the New York Herald Telegram ran a 
headline: ‘‘Reds in a drive for foothold in FM radio.’’ Similarly, the Chicago Journal of 
Commerce saw the PRF’s radio campaign as an attempt to please its ‘‘Masters in Moscow’’ 
(Fones-Wolf, 2006, p. 159). Despite this smear campaign  ̶  and the sudden appearance at the 
July 1946 hearing by The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) investigators 
waving around FBI files on several PRF activists  ̶  hundreds of witnesses testified during the 
weeks-long hearings in favor of the PRF’s requested broadcast license. 
Months later, the FCC awarded licenses to five NYC applicants, but not the PRF. 
Following their rejection, the PRF disbanded and published a book titled The American 
communications conspiracy that explained the ‘‘aims of the foundation and of the FCC’s 
decision which destroyed it.’’ It insisted that any successful media reform movement must lead a 
‘‘curb-the-monopolies drive’’ not reliant on the FCC’s presumed progressive tendencies 
(Konecky, 1948, p. 33). ‘‘The strengthening of a people’s anti-media movement is a better 
answer’’ (Konecky, 1948, p. 166), the book concluded. ‘‘Radio belongs to the people it must be 
given back to them’’ (p. 42). 
Despite its forcefulness, the book failed to impact radio-related policy debates and even 
drew criticism from some liberals, who were increasingly retreating from structural criticism 
(White, 1948, pp. 193-194). This was at least partly a result of intensifying red-baiting that 
rendered all unapologetically left-wing groups officially suspect. The PRF was included in the 
1948 Attorney General’s list of communist classified organizations (Federal Register 13, March 
20, 1948), and was targeted by reactionary groups such as the American Business Consultants, 
which was formed in 1947 by several former FBI agents and published Counterattack, a weekly 
‘‘newsletter of facts to combat Communism.’’ Alleging PRF connections became a standard 
method of red-baiting intellectuals (Cogley & Miller, 1971, p. 94; Barranger, 2004, pp. 228-229). 
Counterattack’s infamous 1950 report, Red channels, which smeared a number of artists and 
performers, listed many people associated with the PRF and similar reform initiatives, including 
Commissioner Durr. 
The void left by the PRF’s dissolution was in part filled by the Voice of Freedoms (VOF) 
Committee, headed by Dorothy Parker and sponsored by an impressive cast of left-wing 
luminaries including Langston Hughes, Paul Robeson, and Orson Welles. In the spring of 1947 
the VOF held a public rally that included recently fired broadcasters such as William Shirer, 
William Gailmor, and Frank Kingdon  ̶  victims of what many saw as a ‘‘purge’’ of liberal radio 
commentators. The rally staged an ‘‘imaginary broadcast’’ from an ‘‘underground’’ radio station 
to contest HUAC and other reactionary trends. The VOF would go on to organize nearly a 
thousand monitors and listening-post volunteers. These efforts were credited in forcing 
broadcasters such as the NYC station WOR to moderate their Cold War rhetoric (Variety 
Magazine, 1947; Konecky, 1947, p. 110; Fones-Wolf, 2006, pp. 125-126). The VOF also sought 
to cultivate relationships with progressive policy elites such as Commissioner Durr, who was 
invited to present an award to the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers’ Union for ‘‘its 
outstanding contribution to American Radio’’ through its weekly broadcasts of ‘‘Let the People 
Speak’’ (Parker, 1948). 
 Another leading left-wing intellectual group engaged with media-related issues was the 
Progressive Citizens of America (PCA), which formed after a merger in early 1947 of two other 
progressive groups (Time, 1947a). Henry Wallace gave a keynote address at their merger, with 
Paul Robeson listed as a vice-chairmen. By mid-1947, the PCA had 25,000 members, with 
chapters in 19 states (Adams, 1985, p. 11; Time, 1947b). At a meeting in New York Durr 
encouraged the PCA to write complaints to the FCC (Clark, 1947). The PCA kept in close 
contact with Durr via its radio division, directed by Norman Corwin. Corwin (2008) would later 
reminisce fondly about his experiences working with Durr, whom he said was a ‘‘broadminded 
commissioner,’’ a ‘‘rare American,’’ and an ‘‘inspiration,’’ who had a ‘‘very benign role in the 
governing of radio,’’ driven by the ‘‘common sense’’ of providing a ‘‘safety net for radio.’’ 
In April 1947, the PCA’s radio division held a conference titled ‘‘Crisis in Radio,’’ aimed 
at ‘‘dealing with the problem of radio today.’’ Durr was asked to address ‘‘the legal and 
administrative basis for the public ownership of the air; rights, limitations, enforcement 
methods.’’ Also invited was the NAACP’s Oliver Harrington to discuss ‘‘the treatment of 
Negroes, Jews, Foreigners and Labor on the air’’ and to provide ‘‘an analysis of the objective of 
the stereotype.’’ William Shirer, the purged liberal radio commentator, offered ‘‘a critique of the 
editorial role of the radio station as shown in its reporting of news’’ and discussed the challenges 
facing liberals on the radio. The Conference’s statement stressed the FCC’s importance in 
defending radio: ‘‘We reaffirm the principle that the air belongs to the people  ̶  to all the 
people.’’ The FCC is the ‘‘proper defender of this heritage,’’ and ‘‘must be adequately financed 
and staffed’’ and receive the ‘‘full support of the Congress’’ to ‘‘assure the reappointment’’ of 
Commissioner Durr ‘‘whose actions and statements have consistently backed these [public 
interest] principles.’’ Durr deserved continued support because ‘‘American radio does not now 
speak’’ for ‘‘labor unions, Americans who belong to racial and religious minorities, Young 
Americans who must be prepared for our future,’’ and who together constitute a majority of 
people who are often under- or misrepresented by radio. The PCA also called for the ‘‘voices of 
liberal men and women’’ who were ‘‘deliberately and consciously shut off ’’ to be restored to the 
airwaves (Anthony, 1947). Ultimately, however, progressives failed in establishing a major radio 
presence and much of their energies dissipated after 1948 when the Wallace campaign deflated 





Media reformers in the 1940s included among their number various religious groups who 
mobilized to gain greater access to the air and to monitor representations of religious ideas and 
institutions. These Christian and Jewish groups would play an instrumental role in a number of 
policy battles; however, few were as active as the liberal Protestants led by Everett Parker, a 
mainstay in media reform efforts for over seven decades. Over the years, Parker played a key 
role in forging new coalitions and winning important victories, earning him the title ‘‘father of 
the citizen media reform movement’’ (Korn, 1991, p. 95). Through the mid-to-late 1940s he 
headed the Joint Religious Radio Committee (later renamed the Protestant Radio Commission). 
During the 1950s he worked closely with the former FCC chief economist Dallas Smythe in 
studying broadcasters’ commitment to educational programming (Parker, Barry, & Smythe, 
1955). Parker also would be instrumental in key civil rights victories around radio in the 1960s, 
particularly the landmark WLBT Supreme Court case. A campaign against the station WLBT’s 
failure to serve the local African American community culminated in the Supreme Court 
determining that the FCC had to consider public interest complaints regarding license renewal 
even from groups not attempting to buy the station (Horwitz, 1997). Parker (2008) has noted that 
many of his media reform successes in the 1960s built upon earlier media reform efforts in the 
1940s and 1950s. 
In the 1940s Parker was a close ally to Durr, whom he befriended through frequent letter 
exchanges and meetings about radio reform. They collaborated around the FCC Blue Book as a 
vehicle to engage different communities and ‘‘teach minority groups how to protect their 
interests’’ in relation to radio. Noting that people in the 1940s were agitating not only against 
excessive advertising but also about programming quality, Parker recalled the strategic 
advantages of many different groups ‘‘working on the same issues at the same time in different 
places’’ (2008). Parker’s testimony regarding the quality of local broadcasting during the 1948 
Mayflower hearings led to revision of the FCC’s no-editorials rule, eventually resulting in the 
FCC’s Fairness Doctrine. 
Sharing the assumption of many postwar media reformers, Parker saw in radio both 
democratic and fascist potential, a fate hinging on whether listeners engaged with the regulatory 
process (Parker, Inman, & Snyder, 1948). Parker (1946) expressed gratitude to Durr for having 
‘‘taken an interest’’ in the work ‘‘to improve the quality of religious broadcasting over local 
stations.’’ Parker hoped that ‘‘if our ministers and others who represent religion on the air can 
obtain an understanding of the problems and possibilities of radio’’ from people like Durr, ‘‘they 
will make a sincere effort to use radio effectively.’’ Parker invited Durr to a workshop focused 
on ‘‘the question of how ministers of churches may lead in enlisting public-spirited business men 
to organize, erect, and operate FM stations solely in the public interest.’’ Durr was to speak on 
‘‘The American Ideal for the Broadcasting Station’’ followed by a discussion of ‘‘FM radio’s 
advantages, costs, and potential services to the community.’’ In general, Durr received much 
positive feedback from religious progressives for helping to prevent radio from becoming merely 
a profit-making tool. 
Other religious groups joined the fray. A Methodist official wrote to Durr: ‘‘The 
evangelicals are beginning to come together for a serious approach to this vast field [of radio].’’ 
He added that ‘‘the upsurge of interest in religious life of the community from the standpoint of 
radio owes more to you than any other man in the Commission’’ (Tyler, 1946). Various Baptist 
groups contacted Durr to set up public service FM stations and promote other reform issues. 
However, the late 1940s saw a split in the religious broadcasting community between the liberal 
Protestants’ radio commission led by Parker, and the Southern Baptist Convention, which sought 
to reserve radio spectrum to service rural communities via low-power stations. The Baptists 
sought to gain favor with the FCC over educators, while apparently lacking resolve in sticking 
with a nonprofit model. ‘‘The more I reflect on the radio picture with the coming of so many FM 
stations into operation,’’ the Baptists’ Radio Committee director wrote Durr, ‘‘the more I am 
convinced that the absolute key to any sort of success in broadcasting whether it be religious or 
otherwise, is programming.’’ He was ‘‘convinced that we must move from the educational type 
station over to the commercial type’’ so they that we may ‘‘earn enough money to finance the 
best program of a varied type on the air.’’ Fearing financial vulnerabilities, he notified all Baptist 
state radio committees to ‘‘swing from the educational type station over to the commercial type’’ 
(Lowe, 1946). 
By the late 1940s, many advocates, including Durr, felt let down that the National 
Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB) and other educational groups were making 
little effort to defend their 20 allotted stations from the Baptists. In the end, media reformers 
compromised by pushing for set-asides for general noncommercial nonprofit stations. Although 
the PRF and ACLU supported this revised petition, its lack of support from nonprofits other than 
the Baptist Convention led the FCC to reject the proposal. Instead of allocating spectrum to 
general noncommercial use, the Commission limited special reservations to educational 
institutions, despite their sometimes-reluctant participation in broadcast reform efforts (Toro, 




Educators comprised a core contingent within the 1940s media reform movement. Largely based 
at big land trust institutions in the Midwest, these reformers were adamant that a significant 
allotment of spectrum be set aside for educational purposes. By the mid-1940s, most 
noncommercial radio had been displaced by commercial broadcasters. One hundred twenty-eight 
educational institutions had launched broadcasting schedules in the 1920s, but only 35 remained 
by 1941 (Sterling & Kittross, 1978, 158), with a slight increase of 51 by 1945 (Ernst, 1946, p. 
163). Although largely defeated in the 1930s, educators had regrouped to some extent in the 
1940s to advocate for FM radio stations. They were aided by the U.S. Office of Education (Toro, 
2000, p. 67) and the FCC, especially Durr, FCC staffer Edward Brecher, and Commissioner 
Walker’s assistant, Walter Emery (Durr, 1945). Sometimes they coordinated to the extent of 
instructing schools on the precise wording of their official testimonies (Durr, 1974). Durr was an 
eager advocate, writing that there was ‘‘no subject’’ for which he had ‘‘a greater interest’’ than 
that of educational broadcasting’’ (1946). He saw existing university stations as potential seeds 
for a more democratic system. Expanding their presence in the new FM band would, Durr 
thought, force even commercial stations to raise their standards. ‘‘A few dozen  or preferably a 
hundred  ̶  good university stations operating on FM might not solve all of our problems [with 
commercialism], but they certainly would be a tremendous help’’ (1944a). 
An important ally in both radio and educational radio campaigns was Morris Novik, the 
former director of WNYC (the municipal radio station connected to NYC mayor La Guardia). 
Helping to form the NAEB and serving as its director from 1941 to 1948, Novik was also the 
program director for the socialist-created New York station WEVD, and was the CIO’s adviser 
on ‘‘radio propagandizing.’’ He helped write, direct, produce, and distribute CIO unions’ radio 
programming, including skits performed by steelworkers and dramatizations of labor news that 
were advertised via public demonstrations and handbills (Godfried, 1997, p. 197). Novik is also 
credited with coining the term ‘‘public broadcasting’’ and remained active into the 1980s. 
Another active group of educators congregated at the University of Wisconsin and 
affiliated with radio station WHA, the ‘‘oldest station in America’’ and the first to launch an FM 
station in the state. In partnership with the U.S. Office of Education, this group had formed the 
FM Educational Radio Institute (ERI), which held annual two-week conferences to ‘‘serve 
persons concerned with the development of FM educational broadcasting in the various states’’ 
(FM ERI, 1945). The director described the conference’s purpose to Durr as ‘‘concentrating on 
radio as a social force’’ (McCarty, 1945). Inspired by similar efforts in the 1930s, Durr 
advocated for 15% of new FM allocations to be reserved for educational radio. Acknowledging 
the ‘‘financial hurdle’’ for ‘‘nearly all colleges and universities whether supported by tuition or 
taxes,’’ he confessed he did not ‘‘expect any great boom in educational broadcasting stations’’ to 
happen immediately. Yet, ‘‘if a few good ones get started,’’ Durr predicted, ‘‘many others will 
follow along and in the course of five or six years there will be enough of them on the air to 
make a significant impression on our general broadcasting picture’’ (1974). Durr’s plan was to 
ease in a handful of successful FM educational stations that would eventually overtake the 
commercial system. 
Despite falling short of this goal, educators were more successful than other nonprofit 
groups, largely because the FCC, especially Durr, advocated aggressively on their behalf and 
requested special set-asides for educational radio. Durr urged colleges, nonprofit commercial 
stations, and other FM stations to embrace educational radio, because ‘‘the present interest 
among educators in FM is high.’’ There was enough momentum, he thought, ‘‘to assure a good 
nucleus of university and college stations.’’ Durr believed they could learn from the ‘‘experience 
of the AM educational stations which have managed to survive the trials and tribulations’’ 
(1944b). However, despite their general passion for educational radio, educators did not always 
unite behind the aggressive efforts that their FCC advocates and others felt were necessary 
(Gibson, 1977, p. xi). Harry Skornia (1945) confided to Durr, ‘‘I’m more convinced than ever 





The major critiques driving a postwar broadcast reform movement can be summarized as the 
following: minority groups were neglected in representation and in hiring practices; 
programming avoided controversial subject matter; entertainment appealed to the lowest 
common denominator to maximize audience size and profits; advertisers’ influence led radio to 
be solely concerned with selling unnecessary and trivial products; and, overall, radio 
programming failed to serve society’s democratic needs. This criticism helped launch a nascent 
postwar media reform movement composed of labor, African Americans, disaffected 
intellectuals, political progressives, educators, and religious organizations. Although these 
groups often cohered around shared goals, they should not be seen as comprising one monolithic 
movement. However, their similar tactics included monitoring commercial broadcasting, 
intervening in broadcast policy debates, and advocating for their own representations, especially 
in the new realm of FM radio. 
While Durr, Smythe, Siepmann, and other progressive policymakers hoped that an 
‘‘aroused’’ public could rescue the stalled reform efforts in Washington, D.C., anticommunist 
hysteria undermined the last of the liberal New Dealers still in places of power and demobilized 
much of the nascent movement’s media reform activism. By 1948, Siepmann’s influence was 
mostly limited to academia and policy debates outside of the U.S., and policymakers such as 
Durr and Smythe had fled an increasingly hostile D.C. The FCC would be dogged by red-baiting 
and continue to exclude leftists well into the 1950s (Brinson, 2004). Moreover, many of the most 
prominent and aggressive activists in major social movements were removed from the political 
field by blacklists and sundry witch hunts. The Progressive Party lay in ruins after Henry 
Wallace’s presidential defeat, and with the radical left purged from the ranks of the Labor and 
Civil Rights movements, many liberals were co-opted into corporatist, industry-friendly 
arrangements. Media criticism would persist, and lone progressive policymakers like Frieda 
Hennock would still serve at the FCC, but at least until the 1960s, despite significant exceptions, 
reform efforts rarely moved beyond the symbolic. The 1940s reform movement’s defeat would 
leave in place a self-regulated commercial broadcasting system that would endure, with 
increasingly fewer public-interest safeguards, until the present day (Pickard, 2010b). 
Quelled by red-baiting and a sudden rightward shift in the American political terrain, the 
postwar media reform movement would never realize the full sum of its parts. Coordination 
between various groups was often limited, and media reform a secondary goal. Yet despite its 
often inchoate nature, the movement did register some small but significant victories, and created 
a foundation for future reforms such as the Fairness Doctrine and public broadcasting. Overall, 
however, the movement failed in advancing its goals or enacting lasting structural changes. 
Contemporary media reformers have much to learn from their 1940s counterparts’ successes and 
failures. Much has changed politically and technologically, but recovering past alternatives may 
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